2/14/09

Love and Tautoko to the Pihema Cameron Whanau











Leanne Cameron says she is serving a life sentence. Photo / Glenn Jeffrey

Leanne Cameron says she is serving a life sentence. Photo / Glenn Jeffrey


Sista had her son murdered and the prick that did it will be out in 11 months. She & her whanau have every right to be angry @ a system that slams Maori and stills give pakeha justice even when they kill a 15 year old boy. Arohanui


First Fleet Back


First Fleet Back from NITV video on Vimeo

A comedy that throws us into a role reversal of Australian History. A hybrid documentary that catapults viewers into an alternate Australian reality and follows Arabunna Elder Kevin Buzzacott’s amazing strategies against racism and for self-determination - before he became the ‘Minister for Invasion Affairs’!

In a blend of cinema verite, blaxploitation and satirical reality TV, this film pushes the boundaries of documentary, offering thought-provoking insights into the past to build a post-colonial future together.

Be alert & alarmed – it’s your chance to vote them off the island – on the First Fleet Back to Europe!

2/12/09

Display the Hawaiian flag on February 24-25


image credit manainfo.com



On February 25, the Supreme Court will be hearing the "ceded"lands case. The State of Hawaii is arguing that Hawaiians have norights to those lands.

MANA (Movement for Aloha No ka Aina), is calling on all supportersof Kanaka Maoli rights and sovereignty to fly or display a Hawaiianflag on February 24 and 25, the eve and day of the Supreme Courthearing on the "ceded" lands case.

Fly your flag proudly! This will be a sign of our resistance to theState's attempt to dissolve our land rights, and a symbol of our unity.

Spread the message far and wide – fly our flag on February 24 and 25.

Download a flag here.

Mahalo to KINE/KCCN, Ka Wai Ola o OHA, Maoliworld, and others for helping to get the word out


http://manainfo.com/

AUST and NZ PUSH TRADE AGENDA IN REGION

Purging the Forum Secretariat


• Maureen Penjueli is Coordinator of the Pacific Network on Globalisation

Governments in Australia and New Zealand are keen to assure Pacific nations that relations with the region are marked by `shared development goals', but as Maureen Penjueli writes, the islands' `big brothers' have been pushing an agenda of their own—especially when it comes to negotiating a regional free trade agreement.

In 2004, the Pacific Network on Globalisation (PANG) released an interim report to look at the implications of the Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations (PACER). PACER is an agreement that paves the way for a free trade agreement between the Forum Islands Countries and Australia and New Zealand (NZ).

That report found disturbing evidence of pressure by Australian and New Zealand officials to push through their free trade agenda in the region. One New Zealand official quoted in the report confirmed with disarming frankness: "When it comes to trade, there is no `special relationship' with the Pacific". The implications are clear—when it comes to trade, international trade strategy takes priority over the views of Pacific governments and the needs of their people.

With the recent changing of the guard in both Australia and New Zealand, there was much hope that Pacific Islands Forum member countries would see improved relations with their `big brothers'. Kevin Rudd's Labor government, in particular, has launched a major public relations exercise since winning office to assure the region that it has Pacific interests at heart (including in the area of trade). Australian and New Zealand government officials have been quick to assert that a free trade agreement under PACER (called PACER-Plus) is designed to benefit the Pacific—while down-playing potential negative impacts for the islands and benefits to their own countries.

These assurances have a hollow ring to them. Several developments in the past two years indicate Australia and New Zealand are not primarily interested in making PACER-Plus meaningful for the Pacific. These developments should give pause to Pacific trade ministers, government officials and the wider public, because both countries have pursued aggressive strategies (mainly behind closed doors) to stack the deck in their favour even before negotiations start.

Islands countries—pawns in a power game

Pacific Islands Countries have had a dismal experience negotiating a free trade agreement (an `Economic Partnership Agreement'—EPA) with the European Union (EU) in recent years. In those negotiations, the Pacific failed to secure meaningful concessions from the EU, and few countries are interested in signing a new deal. Recognising this, the Forum trade ministers decided that a new Office of the Chief Trade Advisor (CTA) should be established separately from the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat to help in the negotiations with Australia and New Zealand.

In March 2008, Pacific trade ministers decided the CTA should be "the only point of contact between Australia and New Zealand and the Forum islands countries (FICs) for PACER-Plus" and that "the CTA takes responsibility for the PACER-Plus negotiations with Australia and New Zealand on the basis of the mandates and negotiating instructions from the FIC Trade Ministers".
However, Australian and New Zealand officials are resisting attempts to have in place, well before negotiations begin, a new Chief Trade Advisor to help organise the region's negotiating positions—critical, given the diversity of Pacific countries, and national-level capacity issues.

This resistance from Australia and New Zealand officials is both unhelpful and unreasonable. After all, we are talking about negotiations between two very unequal partners.

Instead of supporting the Pacific's CTA proposal, Australia announced (in April 2008) a "trade fellowship programme" whereby Pacific trade officials travel to Australia to learn how good PACER-Plus could be for the Pacific, and are trained by Australians to negotiate with them.

Australian officials also announced money would be provided at the national level for Forum Islands Countries (FICs) to undertake studies on PACER—a far cry from a regional office that can guide research and establish strong negotiating positions.
At the Forum Trade Ministers' Meeting in the Cook Islands in July 2008, Pacific trade officials reported bullying tactics, a divide and rule strategy and explicit threats to remove key Forum Secretariat staff. This behaviour was exhibited by both Australian and New Zealand officials, who pushed for the Pacific Trade Ministers to agree to begin negotiations on a wide-ranging free trade agreement during 2009. Officials from several countries put up a fierce resistance to attempts to fast-track PACER-Plus—attempts made by Australia and New Zealand officials and their key Pacific allies, namely Tonga and Nauru, at that meeting.

Australian officials were so disappointed with FIC Trade Ministers' refusal to fast-track the negotiations that they told Pacific media that Australia would not commit funds to set up the CTA office because "it did not regard the outcomes of the July 2008 Forum Trade Ministers' Meeting as constituting an adequate commitment to negotiations that will lead them to fund the CTA".

Having failed to get their way at the Forum Trade Ministers' Meeting, Australian and New Zealand officials took their battle to the annual Forum Leaders' meeting in Niue to secure favourable language. During that meeting, Pacific leaders met separately from Australia and New Zealand and issued a press release which stressed the need for "careful preparations by Forum FICs, both individually and collectively, before consultations began with Australia and New Zealand" and for the early appointment of a Chief Trade Advisor to assist FICs in realising their shared objectives.

However, such caution about entering PACER-Plus negotiations with Australia and New Zealand was not reflected in the outcomes document of the Niue meeting—where Australia and New Zealand leaders were present.

This reflects the position of Australia and New Zealand as major donors in the region, and the importance that Pacific leaders place on maintaining good relations with them. It is not the `Pacific Way' to confront such partners directly. The Niue meeting indicated that Forum Leaders would direct trade officials to "formulate a detailed roadmap on PACER-Plus, with the view to Leaders agreeing at the 2009 Forum to the commencement of the negotiations". This is an outcome Australian officials are happy with, especially as Canberra will host the 2009 Forum Leaders' meeting.

Interventions at the Forum Secretariat

Perhaps, the most damaging aspect of recent Australian and New Zealand interventions, is a blatant attempt to undermine technical advisors and senior management positions in the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS).

At the Niue Leaders' meeting, Australian and New Zealand officials openly advocated for either an Australian or a New Zealand national to be appointed as a permanent Deputy Secretary-General (DSG) of the Forum.
Many regional commentators have commented on the increasing influence of Australia and New Zealand in the Forum over recent years and in particular in redefining of Pacific priorities.

USP academic Sandra Tarte suggests that the ownership of the Forum is increasingly at risk.

She writes that this "sense of ownership has been eroded in recent years as economic, political and security initiatives of the Forum seem to be increasingly driven by Australia and New Zealand (who also control the purse strings)".

If Australia and New Zealand secure a permanent DSG position, this raises questions about whether PIFS is on the verge of becoming a diluted organisation unable to serve the interest of the Pacific Islands Countries.

In another move that raises questions about the ability of the Forum to advocate on behalf of PICs, it appears that the axe has fallen on one of the region's most respected trade advisors, Dr Roman Grynberg, whose contract with the Forum is being conveniently not extended. Those that follow international trade negotiations will know Dr. Grynberg is not a popular figure amongst trade officials from developed countries, who often see him as a key stumbling block for advancing their trade priorities.

In 2003, The Guardian newspaper highlighted a letter between the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the British Government colluding to get rid of "unsympathetic" trade officials within the Commonwealth Secretariat.
One such unsympathetic trade official was Dr Grynberg—whose work advocating on behalf of poor developing countries was seen as derailing free trade discussions.

Reasons for his contract not being extended with the Forum Secretariat were based on a performance review that found him to `lack leadership' and not being `client focused'. The question that begs to be asked is, which client(s) is unhappy with Dr. Grynberg's work? Whatever the reasons for his removal, his absence means the PICs have lost an important critical voice prior to going into negotiations for a free trade agreement with the islands' most important trading partners.

An alternative approach?

The approach taken by Australia and New Zealand to discussions about PACER-Plus during 2008 indicates a strong willingness by those countries to fast-track the process (to ensure negotiations begin at the 2009 Forum Leaders' Meeting), to derail any effective regional negotiating machinery (by refusing to support the Pacific's CTA proposal and funding national-level training and research) and to manipulate the Forum Secretariat meetings to secure their priorities. This approach from Australia and New Zealand has been possible partly because Forum processes (such as the Forum Trade Ministers' Meeting and the Pacific Leaders' Forum) are often conducted behind closed doors—with very little outside scrutiny from the media or civil society groups.

PACER-Plus negotiations could lead to a free trade agreement that will have radical implications for Pacific Islands economies and societies. Any agreement will have a much smaller impact on Australia and New Zealand. A bad agreement could lead to a closing off of policy options that are used to stimulate development in the islands, increase pressure for privatisation and undermining access to basic services.

Certainly, PACER-Plus will lead to business closures and job losses in Pacific countries—problems that will be exacerbated because many Pacific states are reliant on tariffs to raise much-needed government revenue. It is vitally important for Pacific governments to "get this right". Being rushed into negotiations without appropriate research on the implications of PACER-Plus and without a strong regional negotiating body monitored by public oversight— could lead to a complete disaster.
Australia and New Zealand are keen to rush ahead with a far reaching free trade agreement partly because their trade officials are adamant that any pain caused by a new FTA will be short-term, and that increased trade as a result of a new deal will help the Pacific to grow. Australian and New Zealand officials are also concerned that any EPA with the EU will offer better market access to European companies in the region.

In June 2007, both Australian and New Zealand governments confirmed this view. The then Australian Trade Minister Warren Truss stated that, "it's obviously in Australia and New Zealand's interest that any new deal that the South Pacific countries may do with the European Union doesn't disadvantage Australian exporters into those countries".
New Zealand's [then] Trade Minister Phil Goff noted that a free trade agreement between Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific was necessary to ensure that New Zealand "is not disadvantaged by preferential access to Pacific markets being given to European countries."

However, the Australian and New Zealand governments don't have to approach trade relations with the Pacific from such a position of narrow self-interest. If they are really genuine about the region, they could acknowledge the special and different circumstances of the Pacific Islands Countries (PICs), and offer real alternatives to the kind of reciprocal free trade agreement that is being pushed by the EU.

These alternatives could include improvements to the current South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement (SPARTECA), with a focus on enabling Pacific Islands Countries and their peoples to access Australian and New Zealand markets to overcome poverty. Improvements in Rules of Origin requirements, removal of trade barriers (including Australia's kava ban) and assistance with meeting necessary sanitary and phytosanitary rules in Australia and New Zealand are all initiatives that would expand Pacific export opportunities—without requiring a new FTA.

Pacific Way must now be the ANZ Way?

The late Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara coined the term the `Pacific Way' - a term that reflects a Pacific way of development based on conversation, respect and mutual consensus.

In recent years, Australia and New Zealand have moved from strength to strength in their quest to replace the Pacific Way with their way. It appears that their goal is to impose their ideology, their free trade agenda, their institutions and operatives, their economic interests, their political authority and their strategic influence on the islands of the Pacific.

If the approach taken by Australia and New Zealand to PACER-Plus in 2008 is an indication of things to come, then pressure is now on Pacific leaders to take back the initiative and demand an approach to trade relations that reflects Pacific concerns.
PIC Trade Ministers and their officials, and the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat Secretary-General Tuiloma Neroni Slade are more than ever faced with the task of stemming the tide of Australia and New Zealand influence.

If they are not able to, we could see the beginning of the demise of the Pacific Way and the reign of the ANZ (Australia, New Zealand) Way.

See Also
Neoliberalism in the Pacific

Nina Simone - Ain't Got No...I've Got Life

2/11/09

JOIN THE RAT PATROL AGAINST UNFAIR DISMISSALS

From March '09 workers in small businesses will be able to be sacked for any reason, or no reason at all, in their first 90 days of employment. The RAT PATROL has been launched by unions and community groups to make sure no worker get unfairly dismissed under the new law. The Rat Patrol received a great response in Coyle Park last weekend, with hundreds of workers taking leaflets for the demonstration on 28 February. There is loads of anger in the community about the new law, and people love the idea of bringing the giant inflatable rat to shame their own rat bosses. Come along over the next few weeks to give us a hand with the leaflets and sign-ups:

SATURDAY 14 FEB - MANGERE MARKET. Mangere Community Law Centre have reserved a joint space for the Rat Patrol and the campaign to defend Community Law Centres. Meet 9am Unite Office or 10am at Mangere Market, Mangere Town Square off Waddon Place (meet next to the Maori Wardens building).

SAT 14 FEB - CROSS ST CARNIVAL - DETAILS TBC

SUNDAY 15 FEB - AVONDALE MARKET (MORNING) - DETAILS TBC

SATURDAY 21 FEB - OTARA MARKET (MORNING) - DETAILS TBC

Let us know which events you can can help out at, and which other events you'd like to take the rat to. The leaflet can be DOWNLOADED - you can use them anywhere, so sign up your friends and workmates, and send the names back in so we can keep building the RAT PATROL. If you can't find the rat when you get to the event, text me on 0210 358 513 and we'll try to locate you... Hope to see you all tomorrow, Nicola

REGISTER AS A RAT PATROL MEMBER to join the emergency solidarity pickets against unfair sackings. Our goal is to have several hundred people registered as willing and able to respond to appeals for help on short notice. Register with your email address and/or mobile number for text messages. To join email wewontpayforyourcrisis@gmail.com or

REGISTER ONLINE http://www.unite.org.nz/?q=contact
DOWNLOADABLE POSTER here:
http://indymedia.org.nz/newswire/display/76759/index.php

Zapatista Film/Doco Festival - Feb 20,21,22


Zapatista Film/Doco Festival
20, 21, 22 February 2009
62 St. Georges Road, Northcote

Download festival Flyer

Inspiring, creating, fighting

“...We want a world where many worlds are possible...”
Sub Marcos, Zapatista National Liberation Army, Chiapas, Mexico

It is New Year’s Night 1994, the day the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) comes into effect. For the indigenous communities & popular activists in the Lacandona Jungle of South-eastern Mexico, Chiapas, NAFTA symbolizes the culmination of over 500 years of exploitation. During the night, 2,000 indigenous soldiers occupy several cities in the state of Chiapas and declare political and economic independence. They call themselves the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN).

The Zapatista uprising in Chiapas was certainly one of the most dramatic and important instances in our time of a genuine grassroots movement against oppression, we believe that their words and practice can inspire a new generation of activist to see that it is possible for ordinary people, without wealth and advance weapons, to challenge state power successfully.

How after 15 years does the historic and ongoing Zapatista uprising continue to transform the world? How did the poetic fury of their movement become part of the rising tide that sent waves of resistance crashing through the streets of, Seattle, Genoa, Quebec, Washington D.C., France, Greece and Melbourne? What are their weapons? Was it their words? We hope we can answer these questions during and after the Zapatista Festival

The ZAPATISTA Film/doco festival will try to offers to all of us a new way of thinking about political struggle and what we means to live as a human being. We have more than 10 films documentaries from Zapatistas Communities, Mapuche struggles, Brazil (MST), Bolivia (indigenous struggles and others), and shorts presentations from different Latin American indigenous and popular grassroots organisations in struggle today.

The Festival is an inspiring first-hand account of a struggle that will challenge the way we think about the world and our commitments for change

We would like to thank everyone, who contributed to this festival with video productions, people without any experience, professionals, grassroots community productions and Chiapas media project/Promedios for their main contribution to the first inspiring Zapatista film doco festival.

All proceeds from this Festival will support the Third Latin American Solidarity Gathering
“Focus on Colombia and Chile” on July 2009, and the Lake Cowal Gathering on April-Easter 2009

At International Workers’ Centre, 62 St. Georges Road, Northcote
$15 three days (whole Festival) or $8 per day
More info lasnet@latinlasnet.org or call 0400 914 944
Detailed schedule at www.latinlasnet.org

Drinks available, NON BYO, Food provided by Food not bombs, Dinner Friday and Saturday, 7:00 PM
Organised by Latin American Solidarity Network (LASNET)
Supported by Chiapas Media Project/Promedios and Mexico Australia Solidarity Network (MASN)

“The aim is to listen and learn about the struggles, the resistance and rebel movements, support them and bind them together to build a national anti-capitalist, leftist program.”, EZLN

Zapatista Film/Doco Schedules

Friday February 20
6:00 pm “Zapatista” The Movie, a production of Big Noise, 48 minutes
10 minutes open discussion
7:00 pm Dinner, Food Not Bombs
7:30 pm Bolivia, the indigenous from the Andes, a report from England, 30 minutes
8:15pm The Militarisation of Guerrero - Chiapas Media Project/Promedios (CMP/P), 35 minutes
10 minutes open discussion
9:00 pm We are equal, Zapatista women speak - CMP/P, 19 minutes
9:30 pm Festival first day close

Saturday February 21
4:00pm Brazil, “Roots” MST (Landless Movement) struggles for dignity, 42 minutes
20 minutes open discussion
5:15pm Oaxaca, Images of Repression in Oaxaca, 51 minutes
20 minutes open discussion
6:30pm Voice of the Voiceless, a direct production of communities in resistance, 12 minutes
15+- minutes open discussion
7:00pm Dinner, Food Not Bombs
7:30pm A very big train called the Other Campaign, productions audiovisual caracoles Zapatistas, 40 minutes
20 minutes open discussion
8:30pm “You are saying that we can’t pass”, 12 minutes and “Letter for our words” production”, 13 minutes Chiapas Media Projects/Promedios production.
9:30 pm Festival Second day close

Sunday Feb 22
2:00pm, “Switch Off”, Mapuche people struggles against Electric Multinational in Chile, Mapuche are the majority indigenous population in Chile, they support the Zapatista struggle, 65 minutes
10 minutes open discussion
3:40pm, On the Edge, The Femicide in Ciudad Juarez, 57 minutes
20 minutes open discussion
4:55pm, Guatemala, Coffee Justice, 14 minutes
10 minutes open discussion
5:30pm, Water and Autonomy in Zapatistas communities, 15 minutes, Chiapas media Project/Promedios
20 minutes open discussion
6:30pm food and refreshments
7:00pm “the Last Zapatistas and their impact in the EZLN, 48 minutes
20 minutes open discussion
8:30 Zapatista Festival close

"We are sorry for the inconvenience, but this is a revolution."
Sub Marcos, EZLN

Dead Prez Fuck the Law


[Verse 1]
Slap a white boy. Snuff your landlord
Smash some windows. Break the camcord
Rob the corner store. Bomb the precinct
Take the CO. Stab the GT
Pimp the system. Bang for freedom
Fuck the high schools. Burn the prisons
Ride on the record labels. Jump your A&R
Fuck the contract. Push the AR
Get your bank up. Slip the banks up
Break the handcuffs. Invade the campus
Steal some pampers. Smash the cameras
Fuck the police. Grab the camera

[Chorus]
You wonder why we feel like fuck the law
You wonder why we write up on the wall
You wonder why we burn the cities down
Cuz we don't give a fuck, the time is now
You wonder why we feel like fuck the law
You wonder why we write up on the wall
You wonder why we burn the cities down
Cuz we don't give a fuck, the time is now

[Verse 2]
Cock your rifle. Rep your people
Fuck probation. Kidnap your PO
Run the roadblocks. Smash a TV
Fuck with DP. Steal the CD
Kiss my black ass. Nail the judges
Hang the lawyers. Ride for justice
Keep it gangsta. Kill the snitches
Get rid of the middleman. Control your business

[Chorus]
You wonder why we feel like fuck the law
You wonder why we write up on the wall
You wonder why we burn the cities down
Cuz we don't give a fuck, the time is now
You wonder why we feel like fuck the law
You wonder why we write up on the wall
You wonder why we burn the cities down
Cuz we don't give a fuck, the time is now

2/9/09

National/Maori Party honeymoon smashed on Waitangi Day






a guest commentary I wrote for Socialist Aotearoa dedicated to  John & Wikatana Popata


The National/Maori party honeymoon was smashed on Waitangi Day. The brave actions of two young warriors definitely dispelled the pro government propaganda that the National and Maori Party were desperately trying to cement on Waitangi Day. Mrs Harawira’s reaction is complete hypocrisy. Each generation has a right to oppose their oppression. Just because some are sitting at the table with or holding onto the arm of the oppressor that gives them no right to crush dissent when it doesn't suit their own political purposes. Whether our Maori leader’s or Maori elite like to admit it or not there is a groundswell of anger and disappointment that our grassroots have been sold out, again, and wait to get kicked in their teeth by their own. 


When you add up the combined impacts of the “90 Day fire law”, the changes to the RMA, changes to bail laws, the privatisation of welfare, prisons, water and the ongoing impacts recession has on our communities. Our flax roots have every right to be angry. 

The Maori Party is a right wing party, make no mistake about that. Hiding behind the rhetoric of advancing all Maori, they have shown that they are willing to sacrifice the vast majority of Maori for the enrichment and advancement of a few. Our so-called Maori leaders were unwilling to even discuss huge unemployment amongst our people at Waitangi, yet jump at the chance to be involved in privatisation. These neo tribal capitalists are transparent in their greed and their neoliberal modus operandi. These elements have much to gain from the privatisation of public services and their turning over to Maori business interests in the name of “self determination”.

This is exactly what was intended way back when the treaty settlement process & fiscal envelope were touted and subsequently implemented. Maori have already been kicked in the guts from the recession; disproportionally we have already the highest percentage of recently unemployed. Turia’s prescription for recently unemployed Maori is to study as a way to ride out the recession, which is patronising and out of touch as you can get. Expect to see more of the same as nowadays it seems you are not a real Maori if your a worker, gang member or on a benefit. 

The Maori Party has already started to demonise other Maori that don’t “fit with the program”. This is a ploy to soften up and slam into our own disenfranchised & dispossessed and to squash dissent by Maori to the National gubbaments agenda. Our elite will gladly take up the role of the native police to keep the more rebellious and those resentful of these polices in line. At the end of the day, the mokopuna of Roger Douglas will have their say. The mass of our flax roots, our workers, our youth, our gang members and all our whanau at the bottom of the heap struggling to survive. We are the sleeping taniwha that will rise up and take back the future that our Leaders & elite have already sold. 

Sina Brown-Davis 
Ngati Whatua ki Kaipara

References:
Iwi present Key with wish-list for action HERE
SOE shares part of Maori Party 'budget HERE
Gordon Campbell on the challenges that the RMA changes pose for the Maori Party HERE



2/7/09

The Pacification of Contemporary Maori Protest

thanks to Matthew Russell for permission to put up his essay, It was originally printed in Red & Green # 5 in 2005


Expressing his surprise that people ever consented to submit to their governments David Hume elegantly wrote, "Force is always on the side of the governed, the governors have nothing to support them but opinion. Tis therefore, on opinion only that government is founded; and this maxim extends to the most despotic and most military governments, as well as to the most free and most popular." (Russell, 1995, p632) Considering Hume was hardly a libertarian by the standards of the day, this is a revealing quote. It is recognition of the simple principle that in societies where obedience can no longer be maintained solely by the whip, containment of thought becomes the foundation of state. 

While this truism has been basic to the most divergent of revolutionary thought, and employed for the most divergent of revolutionary purposes, it has been perhaps most usefully theorised by Antonio Gramsci through his concepts of hegemony and passive revolution. I think these concepts provide a useful theoretical context in which to analyse the development of contemporary Maori protest, a movement which started as a direct challenge to the legitimacy of the colonial state and the capitalist social/economic system, and was steered on a course that lead it far away from any such challenge. The first half of this article focuses on the development of Maori militancy in Aotearoa/New Zealand between 1965 and 1980, drawing primarily from Evan Poata-Smith's insightful analyses of the period. (1996, 2005) In the second section I will discuss the strategic modes of power employed by the Pakeha state to circumvent this threat. Finally, I will look at what these developments mean for the future of Maori self-determination. Firstly, a brief outline of terms is required.

Hegemony refers to the processes whereby certain social groups maintain social authority through the manufacturing of consent, that is, achieving a monopoly over the means of discourse circulation to such a degree that they are able to frame all competing definitions within their own discourse, so that subordinate groups, while not necessarily controlled, act within an ideological framework that is essentially invisible. By achieving a level of ideological saturation throughout all dimensions of social life the dominant discourse appears natural, "to lie outside history." (Simon, 1982,p49) Ideology is rendered inescapable and becomes a framework for making sense of the world such that its very taken-for-grantedness makes it a completely lived relation. A hegemonic order does not simply determine the content of ideas, but it does attempt to set the boundaries within which the ideas and conflicts of subordinate groups are articulated and resolved. When these boundaries are respected hegemony is strong; when they are challenged or transgressed there is a crisis of hegemony. In this way hegemony attempts to naturalise the prevailing structures of power, it serves as the foundation of their legitimacy. The burden falls on the critical analyst (read: everybody) to pierce this taken-for-granted veil of normalised forms, to expose the set of rules and conventions that are at any time 'given' and 'natural' for all of society.

A passive revolution is the path hegemonic groupings will usually follow when faced with what Gramsci termed an 'organic crisis': "immediate and fundamental political and economic problems requiring a reformation of state institutions and the dissemination of new ideologies, and characterised by incessant and persistent efforts which are made to conserve and defend the existing system." (Simon,1982,p39) This is a notion derived from conservative tradition going back to Burke who argued that society had to change in order to say the same, that sometimes superficial institutional and ideological reorganisation is required in order to preserve the essential features of a status-quo. (Adams,1998,p75) While a passive revolution is geared towards the re-establishment of hegemony, any required institutional or ideological modifications are usually made from above, through the agency of the state apparatuses, without relying on the active participation of the population. The key point with both passive revolutions and the concept of hegemony is that is that the consent they aim to create and sustain is not simply a false consciousness in the Marxian/Feuerbachian sense, but is built on real albeit limited concessions and negotiations - it is more concerned with the incorporative deflection of opposition, rather than simply ushering it out of existence with 'ruling class ideas'. Hence for a passive revolution to be successful, it depends on the flow of real resources within the hegemonic system, and they serve to encumber and deflect the development of a counter-hegemony.

In New Zealand state hegemony over white settlers has only been called into question in extreme circumstances, such as the periods of dire economic decline suffered during the depression era of the 20's and 30's, and the fiscal crises of the 70's and early 80's. As a whole however, it has been efficiently maintained through consent. By contrast, rule over Maori for much of the past 150 years has been exercised via coercion, primarily legal and economic, what Jane Kelsey has termed "legal imperialism". (Spoonly et al,1984, p20) During the late 1970's and early 1980's the state was confronted with a crisis of legitimacy brought on by the failures of the capitalist system, as well as the increasingly militant reassertion of Maori economic and political rights guaranteed under the Treaty of Waitangi. This forced the New Zealand government to engage in a passive revolution, redirecting the ethic of tino rangatiratanga into the legal, bureaucratic and political channels of state hegemony. In essence, this was the subjugation of a refractory social group through consensual means at a time when coercive methods had become ineffectual. In order to elucidate this process it will be necessary to look at the history of Maori protest.

The collapse of the post war boom and the emergence of the new left between the 1960s and 1970s saw an unprecedented resurgence of political engagement internationally, events that were closely paralleled in New Zealand. Maori protest groups formed part of the progressive social movements of the time and sought to broaden the fight against racism and Maori oppression. A close working relationship was formed between Pakeha anti-racist groups such as CARE and HART which galvanised around opposition to sporting relations with the South African apartheid regime. The dramatic increase in strike activity and class struggle provided an organisational base for Maori protest groups demonstrated in the emergence of Te Hokioi and the Maori Organisation on Human Rights (MOORH). Both organisations had solid trade union links, and both advocated an alliance between Maori and progressive sections of the Pakeha working class. For Te Hokioi, the fundamental cleavage in society was between labour and capital, and racism was seen as symptomatic of class domination and inherent contradictions within the capitalist system. Both Te Hokioi and MOORH embraced the Treaty as a means to Maori autonomy in a harmonious bicultural society, providing past injustices were redeemed. Both groups advocated a pan-racial struggle along class lines as the most effective strategy for resolving racism and Maori inequality. (Poata-Smith,1996, p101)

The momentum of these groups subsided gradually during the early 1970s as the drive of the movement shifted towards the brown power of Auckland protest groups. Organisations such as Nga Tamatoa and the Polynesian Panthers were heavily influenced by the black power philosophies of American revolutionaries Stokley Carmichael and Huey Newton, and forcefully emphasised the goal of Maori self-determination. The Polynesian Panthers saw the roots of Maori and Pacific Islander inequality in the oppressive social relations embodied in the capitalist system, and promoted a strategy of liberation based on complete overthrow of the capitalist system. "The revolution we openly rap about is one of total change. We see that many of our problems of oppression and racism are tools of this society's outlook based on capitalism; hence for total change one must change society altogether." (Poata-Smith,1996, 102) As these movements developed however a rift formed between those who saw the whole system as fundamentally flawed, and those who sought real change for Maori through existing political structures, who believed that providing the appropriate legal measures were implemented, New Zealand capitalism coupled with the parliamentary system could be cleansed of racism and provide the basis for Maori success. Nga Tamatoa was especially polarised between revolutionaries and reformists which lead to its eventual collapse in the late 70's. Nevertheless, as Poata-Smith writes, "Despite the divergent political and strategic philosophies, there was no room to mistake the object of protest and the enemy of Maori as anything other than a state which was seen as being both racist and capitalist." (1996, p105)

Although the reformist tendency was present throughout early Maori protest, the failures of the third Labour government to halt land alienation and secure Maori rights crystallised the movement's challenge to state hegemony. The 1980s land rights movement fuelled intense political activism and mass civil disobedience demonstrated in the land-occupations at Bastion Point and Raglan, mass protests such as the hikoi of 1984, and the systematic militant boycotts of Waitangi day celebrations. These direct action tactics brought together the diverse Pakeha left and generated wide public support, solidarity actively promoted by many Maori activists. As Te Roopu o te Matakite, the organising committee behind the 1975 Land March on parliament published, "We seek the support of workers and their organisations as the only viable bodies which have sympathy and understanding of the Maori people and their desires. The people who are oppressing the workers are the same who are exploiting Maori today." (Poata-Smith, 1996, p110) The high level of political intensity which characterised the period provided the environment for the emergence of a more radical leadership and a level of group solidarity that the Maori protest movement has yet to regain. By the early 1980s Maori had become a cohesive and powerful protest group that directly challenged the legitimacy of state, and could no longer be efficiently contained within the hegemonic system thorough purely coercive means.

The push towards Maori autonomy was only one part of a general legitimation crisis suffered by the colonial state between 1979 and 1985. The politicisation of gender and ethnic inequality, political turmoil, a rise in unemployment as well as fiscal instability and extreme economic immiseration brought on by the natural tendency in capitalism for the general rate of profit to fall seriously endangered the hegemony of the ruling political forces. In order to resolve its organic crisis the colonial government was forced to engage a passive revolution on two fronts. The first an economic policy based on radical neo-liberal economics and ideology known as Rogernomics. The second a race relations policy aimed at pacifying and containing Maori demands without disrupting the economic and political structures of the Pakeha state. The latter was principally achieved through the Waitangi Tribunal, and the official policy of biculturalism.

Kelsey describes the judicial initiatives of the fourth Labour government to ostensibly 'expand' the Waitangi Tribunal as "a shift from overt contempt to a much more subtle and pernicious form of subjugation, and the evolution of the Waitangi Tribunal as a panacea which helped stabilise, and later actively legitimate the Pakeha state." (Spoonley et al,1991, 108) The Tribunal was constructed as an ideological state apparatus concerned with shaping the nature of Maori demands and integrating a recalcitrant social group into the hegemonic system. This was carried out through a judicial rewriting of the Treaty which eschewed the contradictions between the Maori and English versions of the texts, and the dilemma of applying rules of Treaty interpretation which would give primacy to the Maori text, and hence tino rangatiratanga. The court's rewriting of the Treaty via the principles of the Treaty gave precedence to the colonial version and dictated the Tribunal's mode of operation. This was essentially a redefinition of the government's obligations under the Treaty to make them compatible with the absolute authority of parliament to make laws and policy, including corporatisation. Thereby, "The Tribunal was a victory for all parties it had provided sufficient relief to satisfy the specific and limited demands of the Maori litigants, whilst reinforcing the legitimacy of the state." (Kelsey,1991, p111)

The Tribunal was soon revealed to be a toothless tiger, limited to making recommendations on particular claims on which the government was under no obligation to act. While the Tribunal has served a positive function, protecting Maori rights in specific areas, (mostly through the dedication of under-funded and under- resourced personnel) it has been easily marginalized in times of political turbulence and Pakeha reaction and cynically lionized in periods of cultural conflict. Its subordinate position has been made clear by the Court of Appeal, "However persuasive its research, findings and recommendations may be, they do not approach those of the character of a court or of judicial decisions. While some of its insights are valuable, and while they cannot bind us some of them deserve attention for their careful analysis of the Treaty and its principles." (Walker,1987,p76) Furthermore, the processes by which commercially restructured iwi authorities were able to position themselves as the principle Maori authorities in negotiating the parameters of the Treaty settlement framework meant that by the early 1990s, those representing tribal corporations and Maori business interests were able to exert a powerful influence over the formation and framework for settling historical injustices. (Poata-Smith, 2004, p74) Thus the Tribunal can be described as having 4 main functions: (1) a legitimation and consolidation of colonial legislative and state hegemony, (2) a safety valve for more radical Maori demands, (3) circumvention of the Maori version of the Treaty, (4) channelling Treaty resource reallocation back into the capitalist system.

The second dimension of Labour's passive revolution was the doctrine of biculturalism. In theory this was framed as a final break with the colonial ideology of assimilation to a society based on the recognition and celebration of ethnic diversity. In practise, biculturalism aims at recasting images of nationality and the nation state in terms of unity through diversity, rather than a system of domination and subordination, and exclusion and inclusion. Biculturalism has a specific functionality within societies based on ethnic domination; just as liberalism and egalitarianism have a specific functionality in societies based on class domination. As Pearson has written, "in their various cross-national forms, both multiculturalism and biculturalism have been shown to consistently reify culture to the detriment of class and race such that these divisions within society are simply glossed over by elites, majority or minority, who are the main beneficiaries of ethnic and class hierarchies." In other words, biculturalism in class or ethnically stratified society is ideological in the sense it represents an individual's imaginary relationship to their real conditions of existence. 


In New Zealand biculturalism was (and is) characterised by the large-scale appropriation of Maori personnel, Maori models of organisation and Maori social practices and cultural symbolism and their incorporation into the institutions of state. The hegemonic system easily accommodated ethnic rhetoric, giving the illusion of partnership as enshrined by the judicial rewriting of the Treaty and thereby marginalizing more radical demands. While no significant gains were made towards rectifying the peripheral position the majority of Maori occupy in New Zealand society, the policy of biculturalism did result in an expansion of opportunities for middle class professional Maori within the hegemonic apparatus. Indeed, Labour actively pursued a strategy of containment, co-opting key members of the protest movement within the institutions of state, forcing many Maori elite to walk the razors edge between pushing the movement forward and maintaining the status-quo. For Poata-Smith, "The prestige and wealth that went with such privileged positions within the settlement process meant that Maori leaders became increasingly removed from the concerns and vitality of the flax-roots Maori struggle." (1996, p109) The result of such divisive tactics was demonstrated in the 1994 Sealord deal where the National government embarked on a series of clandestine negotiations with select Maori elite for a full and final settlement of fishery claims under the Treaty. The undemocratic nature of these negotiations fuelled intense anger and an upsurge of Maori protest, pointing to the fact that no matter how successful a passive revolution may be in the short-term, it can only ever be a temporary respite.

The massive state dissemination of bicultural ideology provided the environment for a dramatic shift in Maori protest and the emergence of 'cultural nationalism', a political strategy also concerned with the reification of Maori culture. This was a widespread ideology throughout the 1980s and 1990s and was endorsed by affluent right wing ideologues such as Donna Awatere who argued that all social disjunctions in New Zealand occurred within a common cultural matrix. Stratified society was said to reflect certain inherent Pakeha cultural characteristics such as materialism, competitiveness, and destructive self-interest, which had undermined traditional Maori egalitarian values. Maori culture was said to possess an intrinsic integrity that had been systematically debased since colonisation. The solution was an immersion in Maoritanga, or Maori identity as a way to combat social alienation.

This was essentially a reactionary ideology that characterised Pakeha as homogeneous and monolithic cultural blob, all of whom apparently confronted Maori in a universally antagonistic manner. (Poata-Smith, 1996, 2005) Perhaps more dangerous, cultural nationalism, as reified binarism, served to obscure the class differences and conflicting class interests within Maori society itself. Such an approach that aims at harnessing the fear of the Other, stabbing the master with their own knife, necessarily negates all the all the messy, oppositional, dynamic, ceaselessly turbulent ensembles of discourses that constitute any culture, elements best left undiscerned by tendentious ideologues who are content to view the Other through the binary gaze, as an object of fear and hostility. While ethnic identity and cultural self-determination should be the start and end point of any movement attempting to subvert colonial hegemony, an introverted and ideological focus on identity alone does not pose a threat to the underlying social relations of capitalism, and secures the continuation of the primal sociological causes behind ethnic hierarchy and racism. Strategically, such an approach encumbers the necessity of building alliances with other progressive social movements aimed at the change or transformation of society. The pervasiveness of cultural nationalism has been crucial to the longevity of the passive revolution and the containment of tino rangitiratanga.


In order for a non-reductionist reading of Gramsci it is necessary to note what sets him apart from classical Marxism, from which he takes his pedigree. Gramsci has, and will always remain relevant precisely because he was a Marxist neither in the positivist, scientific, dogmatic, orthodox or religious sense, and explicitly set his face against the economic reductionism of the 'classic' base-superstructure model canonised at the time of the Second International. For Gramsci, there is never a single, coherent unified 'dominant ideology' that radiates out from above and incorporates everything. His concept of hegemony is a 'moving equilibrium' in which ideology is an uneven and differentiated terrain of varied, competing and clashing discursive currents, what is best described as an ideological ensemble or a discursive formation. Moreover, hegemony does not simply mirror the class structure of society, nor can hegemony be directly reduced to its economic content or function. Because hegemony relies on the winning of consent it has a multi-arena, multi-dimensional character - so while we may perceive its most concentrated and lurid form within the state and state apparatuses, it cannot be said in any meaningful way to originate from within and radiate out from the state. The exercise of the kind of power that requires consent only has meaning as a power relation - it requires active participation. 


Gramsci went to great pains in stressing the diversification of social antagonism, and the dispersal of power throughout society. Consent is maintained through allowing the greatest level of articulation between the will-to-power of subordinate groups and the will-to-power of the dominant social alliances, the 'historic block'. Unless hegemony is to collapse into a purely coercive class-domination model, there must be a flow of real resources and real compromise within the hegemonic system, and these must be substantial enough to assuage the will-to-power of a significant proportion of the masses, without debasing the fundamental political and economic foundations of the dominant hegemonic groupings. Thus a historic bloc, if it is to maintain a position of hegemonic supremacy, depends on articulating its own power agendas with, in Foucaultian terms, the 'capillary' power at the level of organic society i.e.; schooling, the family, churches, cultural and economic organisations, but most importantly the so-called private sphere; gender, sexual relations, ethnic identities and so-forth. These connective hegemonic mechanisms between civil society and the historic bloc have both a material and an ideological dimension. In regards to the latter, Gramsci distinguished between two 'floors' of ideology, 'philosophy' and 'common sense'. Ideology depends on a solid, coherent philosophical elaboration, but in order to enter into and influence the directions of social interaction, it must ground itself in the everyday, practical and lived consciousness of the population - common-sense. Common sense is not wholly organic, nor is it wholly a reducible to the agencies of hegemonic dissemination or the material relations of capitalist society. Rather, as Hall writes, "Common sense is usually disjointed and episodic, fragmentary and contradictory. Into it the traces and stratified deposits of more coherent philosophical systems have sedimented over time without leaving any clear inventory. It represents itself as the traditional wisdom of the ages, but in fact, is deeply a product of history." (1996, p431) Common sense is important because it is the arena in which the lived consciousness of the masses is formed, it is the 'taken-for-granted' terrain on which all political and social ideologies must compete for articulation. Thus, when those social groups who are in a position of political and economic supremacy wish to pursue their agendas within the framework of consent, they are forced to enter into a kind of dialectic with these structures of popular thought. The Western state can never be simply an administrative and coercive apparatus, it is the point from which hegemony over society is ultimately exercised and condensed, though it is far from the only place where hegemony is constructed and sustained. 
Thus we can see how hegemony in New Zealand incessantly seeks to articulate itself with capillary level power. One such development evident since 1984 has been the way in which the state has relied on representatives of iwi, hapu and urban Maori communities to sell the idea of Maori capitalist development and self-advancement. (Rata, 2000) This strategy has been effective since it appealed to the material interests of those Maori linked to the Pakeha bourgeoisie and has found no forceful opposition from a movement that no longer specifically links capitalism with ongoing Maori oppression. Indeed, the fourth Labour government introduced legislation that allowed iwi to enter into privileged arrangements with government and the private sector on the condition that they restructured themselves along the dictates of corporate organization. After 1990, National governments increasingly recognised restructured 'neo-traditionalist' corporate entities as the orthodox representative bodies for receiving and managing the assets that would flow from compensation deals with the Crown. For Elizabeth Rata, "the appropriation of these traditionalist ideologies serve to present these developments as reviving traditional, non-exploitative, democratic, communal relations of production within iwi and hapu while concealing the underlying exploitative character of tribal capitalism." (2000, p102) The cultures surrounding 'the corporate warrior' and 'tribal corporatism', as with the current Clark government's 'culturally sensitive' initiatives on Maori education, encouraging the 'pursuit of mana' through Pakeha educational and employment institutions are all lucid examples of hegemony working itself through capillary terrain.

Similarly, today it seems likely that the anger and action generated by Labour's latest attempt to curtail Treaty property rights will be redirected and contained within the hegemonic system via an easily marginalized, politically ambiguous, and seemingly culturally centred Maori Party potentially dominated by elite interests. 1 While the Party has been ambivalent and deflective in outlining any clear policy on anything, Willie Jackson made it clear right at the start that tino rangatiratanga will not be on the agenda for the new party, Taraiana Turia quickly shied away from any suggestions of forming a separate Maori parliament, and Pita Sharples has been consistent in touting 'race based funding' as the best way to combat Maori inequality, rather than the fair and equitable redistribution of productive economic resources which is a fundamental Maori right as guaranteed under the Treaty, and the bulwark of Maori economic disadvantage. Certainly, considering the current climate of Pakeha reaction, and the lack of alternative avenues for struggle, the Maori Party hardly needs policy. Both the Party's unwillingness to situate themselves politically and the stated possibility of coalition with National are suspect in the extreme - astounding in light of Brash's recent spectacular attempts to cast Maori as deviant and use the subordination of an entire ethnic group as a vehicle for his own political aspirations. Asserting her support of the corporate iwi, Turia remarked in a recent Listener interview, "In reality, if you look at the history of the National Party, because of their free-market, private enterprise philosophy, they have actually allowed Maori people to participate and take back some control". (Black, 2005, p16) The utter devastation wrought on Maori communities by neo-liberalism is a non-issue, apparently. The Maori Party is quickly and clearly demonstrating the bankruptcy of the colonial state in achieving any real change for Maori, and its commitment to following the same orthodox and fruitless methods of parliamentary reformism that have largely dominated Maori politics for the past 20 years.

Most importantly however, hegemony in New Zealand has its foundations of legitimacy most firmly embedded in the capillary level will-to-power of the Pakeha majority, and it is this group that is responsible in the last instance for maintenance of hegemony. Pakeha cultural identity has been intimately formed around the cultures of colonial domination, and our ethnicity (if such a thing can be said to exist) draws most of its paltry substance from these very colonial binaries and ethnic hierarchies that secure Maori subordination. Pakeha, as the ruling ethnic group, does not recognise its culture as an ethnic one, but a national and hegemonic one, one that is so firmly established - through political and legal institutions; schools the media etc - as to be common sense, to exist beyond both history and consciousness. Our ethnicity, and its privileged position of a national one is of course deeply a part of history, and only the end-product of the systematic violence employed in the subjugation of another ethnic group. As Bell rightly stresses, "This conflation of ethnicity and nationality results in a primary identification with the nation on the part of many white New Zealanders in a way which helps to maintain their control over the organization of social life. Our way of doing things, our structures, our aims are normal and common sense. Conversely, those of others are strange and not to be countenanced in the organization of politics, work etc, but to be reserved for picturesque display and consumption in leisure, tourism, or wherever else exoticism may be required". (1996, p149) Pakeha ethnicity, as a hegemonic ethnicity, only has meaning contrasted to Maori marginalisation, and thus any transgression of Maori power onto Pakeha hegemony - whether it is simply an attempt to remind us of the historical facticity of our violently achieved hegemonic position, or a more substantial move to restructure our institutions of power along non-European lines - are perceived as a most personal threat that must be eliminated, the degree of transgression determining the degree of vehemence employed in its elimination. This is the will-to-power distilled: predictability, calculability, efficiency and control. The yearning to maintain these discursive fortifications of predicability; the power to mark, assign and classify reflects the most personal desire to exercise the greatest possible measure of control over one's social reality. Just how reliant Pakeha cultural identity is on these ethnic hierarchies has been demonstrated in depressingly clear terms over the past 13 months.


In concluding, while this essay, in the limited space I have here, has focused primarily on the economic and material factors which secure Maori subordination, this is certainly not to say these factors have any kind of determining character in perpetuating ethnic inequality and racism, or that a simple change of the relations of economic production will somehow correspond to a withering of racism within New Zealand society. While it is important to theorise on the strategies of hegemony that the bodies of centralised social power will employ so that we can predict on future patterns of reaction these structures may follow and thereby impede and subvert them, it is also important to recognise the limits of such an analysis. Any overriding 'classist' approach that seeks to prioritise economic factors over cultural factors in the perpetuation of ethnic hierarchies is of scant theoretical value. Racism, as with sexism, are not creations of the capitalists, and as shown here, the functionality of hegemony may be to protect the mastery certain social groups hold over the major means of economic production, but the consent on which this mastery is ultimately founded is explicitly cultural. For Gramsci, while common sense cultures can be influenced, manipulated, sustained, suppressed, augmented and altered via state power, they are by no means created by this power. The calls for a 'return to class', if this is taken to mean a corresponding retreat from culture - which appears to be currently fashionable within the discourse of the New Zealand left - seems to be a matter of false dichotomies and false solutions. An adequate understanding of how power operates within mature-capitalism reveals the needlessness of any such prioritisation, or any such separation at all. 


Similarly, the corresponding leftist condemnation of Maori 'identity politics' is in need of discussion, since identity politics are the most powerful of all revolutionary politics, and do not deserve to be condemned. I would say any kind of identity politics separated from the transformation of society isn't real identity politics, it would be more accurately termed 'image politics' - in Debord's words, "the simultaneous negation of life and affirmation of appearance". (1994, p13) Because Pakeha hegemony cannot subsume real ethnic identity, it relies instead on the appearance of ethnic identity. Within the discursive circumscriptions of hegemony Maori identity is only permitted so long as it reaffirms the illusion of equality and obscures the reality of inequality. Whether it takes the form of a commodity as in the tourism industry, an icon of nationalism as with the haka or the Anzac day celebrations, Te Reo Maori in state subsidised classrooms, Maoritanga in Te Papa, taonga outside the Beehive or the specious biculturalism of government institutions concerned with the biggest confiscation of Maori land in over a century; Maori identity, at one time both reified and enshrined by the very establishment it once organised itself against is stripped of is subversive potentiality and serves as an affirmation, rather than a refutation of the status-quo. Biculturalism did not liberate but liberize Maori identity. In this way hegemony attempts to reduce Maori identity to a social role, a ticket issued by Pakeha society to be bought and stamped in return for initiation into Pakeha society. The role locates one in a representational hierarchy - whether at the top, bottom or middle, but never outside the hierarchy. In this sense, the desire for real identity, identity free from the circumscriptions of hegemony, must necessarily imply a way of living; relative cultural autonomy, ownership of rightful productive resources, self-determination in structuring modes of social organization, self-governance, equality - all goals of the flax-roots radicalism of the 60's and 70's. Identity should rightly be both the means and the end of revolutionary struggle. 


So in sum the passive revolution has and continues to be successful to the degree in which it has diffused the elements of Maori protest which directly challenged the legitimacy of colonial legislative, political and economic hegemony and has succeeded in maintaining the status-quo through superficial institutional reorganisation. As stated above, a passive revolution is only a temporary respite, and we have seen a periodic resurgence of Maori protest demonstrated in opposition to the Sealord deal, the fiscal envelope proposal and Labour's foreshore and seabed legislation. However, the movement is yet to regain the intensity, depth and revolutionary ethic which characterised early Maori protest. The circumscription of Maori identity, as with economic inequality and group stratification are at the heart of New Zealand social organization, and will not be changed through the legislative and political institutions of the Pakeha state. It's true that a few drops of blood have been squeezed out of these particular stones, but this was overwhelmingly a result of the early protest movement, not the parliamentary diversion. It is my argument that a return to militancy will be required if ethnic equality in New Zealand is to become anything more that a seductive illusion, a militancy that perceives in the desire to destroy ethnic hierarchy the necessity of the transformation of society in total. History shows us that anything less is mere palliative.

Bibliography


Bell, A. (1996) "'We're all just New Zealanders': A Survey of Pakeha Identity Politics" in P. Spoonly, C. Macpherson & D. Pearson (eds.) Nga Patai: Racism and Ethnic Relations in Aotearoa/New Zealand, Palmerston North: Dunmore Press.

Black, J. (2005) "Let Us Be Our Own Solution" in The New Zealand Listener, VOL 198 NO 3391, May 7-13 2005,

Debord, G. (1995) The Society of the Spectacle, New York: Zone Books

Forgacs, D. (1988) A Gramsci Reader, London: Lawrence and Wishhart.

Foucault, M. (1980) Power/Knowledge : Selected Interviews and Writings, 1972-1977, Brighton, Sussex : Harvester Press

Hall, S. (1996) Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies, London: Routledge.

Kelsey, J. (1984) Legal Imperialism and the Colonisation of Aotearoa in P. Spoonley, C. Macpherson, Pearson, D. & Sedgwick, C. (eds.) Tauiwi: Racism and Ethnicity in New Zealand, Palmerston North: Dumore Press.

Kelsey, J. (1991) Treaty Justice in the 1980s in P. Spoonley, D. Pearson & C. Macpherson (eds.) Nga Take: Ethnic Relations in Aotearoa/New Zealand, Palmerston North: Dunmore Press.

Pearson, D. & Sedgwick, C. (eds.) Tauiwi: Racism and Ethnicity in New Zealand, Palmerston North: Dumore Press.

Pearson, D. (1991) "Biculturalism and Multiculturalism in Comparative Perspective" in P. Spoonley, D. Pearson & C. Macpherson (eds.) Nga Take: Ethnic Relations in Aotearoa/New Zealand, Palmerston North: Dunmore Press.

Pearson, D. (1990) A Dream Deferred: The Origins of Ethnic Conflict in New Zealand, Wellington: Allen and Unwin.

Pearson, D. & Sissons, J. (1997) "Pakeha and Never Pakeha" in Sites, 35: 64-80.

Poata-Smith. (2005) "Ka Tika A Muri, Ka Tika A Mua?" in Tauiwi: Racism and Ethnicity in New Zealand, Palmerston North: Dumore Press.

Poata-Smith, E. (1996) He Pokeke Uenuku i Tu Ai: "The Evolution of Contemporary Maori Protest" in P. Spoonly, C. Macpherson & D. Pearson (eds.) Nga Patai: Racism and Ethnic Relations in Aotearoa/New Zealand, Palmerston North: Dunmore Press.

P. Spoonly, C. Macpherson & D. Pearson (eds.) (1996) Nga Patai: Racism and Ethnic Relations in Aotearoa/New Zealand, Palmerston North: Dunmore Press.

Rata, E. (2000) The Political Economy of Neo-Tribal Capitalism, Lanham: Lexington Books.

Russell, B. (1995) History of Western Philosophy, London: Routledge.

Simon, R. (1982) Gramsci's Political Thought, London: Lawrence and Wishart.

Walker, R. (1987) Nga Tau Tohetohe: Years of Anger, Auckland: Penguin Books

2/6/09

169 years of Oppression is nothing to celebrate


Ka Pai , good job, 169 years of oppression, only colonised fools would celebrate their own demise in their own lands. Good job john honkey & sell out sharples, look for the resistance to your combined agenda to intensify.

You have to ask yourself what world our so called Maori leaders live in when they ignore this:

New Zealand jobless count up 37 per cent last year

05.02.09 03:44

As the economy fell into recession, the number of jobless New
Zealanders rose nearly 37 per cent last year, topping 100,000 for the
first time since 2002, according to official figures released Thursday.

With 105,000 workers idle, the unemployment rate rose steadily
throughout the year to reach 4.6 per cent, Statistics New Zealand
said, reporting its quarterly household labour force survey, dpa reported.

Economists have tipped the jobless rate to reach 7 per cent by early
next year despite economic stimulus measures announced by the new
centre-right government elected in November.

The figures showed indigenous Maori workers worst affected, with 9.6
per cent of them jobless in the December quarter, followed by 7.8 per
cent of Pacific islanders and 6.3 per cent of Asians.

The unemployment rate for the dominant ethnic European population was
3.2 per cent.
and ignorance is no defence :

4:00AM Friday Feb 06, 2009
By Yvonne Tahana


Iwi leaders who control assets estimated at $5 billion met Prime
Minister John Key to brief him on ways they could move important Maori
issues forward.

But on a day when dreadful unemployment numbers for Maori were released
- 9.6 per cent compared with 4.6 per cent nationally - it was a subject
that was not on the forum's agenda.

Forum chairman Sonny Tau, also the Te Runanga o Ngapuhi chairman, said
unemployment was not discussed. He would not be drawn on why
The majority of our population are young, and our so called elders & leaders have already spent the future that has been taken away from our youth, its time to take it back.

Ka whawhai tonu matou ake tonu atu




2/2/09

Waitangi



the tino rangatiratanga movement of the 1990s

The British invaded Aotearoa in the 1800s. In comparison to many indigenous societies overseas, Maori were offered a Treaty – the Treaty of Waitangi of 1840 – that guaranteed Maori access to, and control of, traditional resources such as land, fishing areas, and so on. The Treaty was then systematically ignored by the English state. Maori were forcibly dispossessed of almost all their former resources. Because of this dispossession and near genocide, Maori have a long tradition of rebellion against the “colonial state.”

After 1945, many Maori migrated to urban areas, and consequently became more integrated into the working class. Maori became disproportionately employed in low-paid blue-collar manual labour and service industries, occupations such as freezing workers and timberworkers. Maori became a significant sector of the working class. Most blue-collar industries were “restructured” in the 1980s, and thus working class Maori bore much of the brunt of neoliberal reforms; indeed, Maori suffered significantly higher levels of unemployment and poverty than Pakeha from the 1980s.

Some commentators claimed Maori represented the biggest threat to the imposition of neoliberal regime of accumulation on the working class. Maori had a long tradition of autonomous resistance, were opposed to the colonial state, had only relatively recently been incorporated into capitalism, and had a distinct culture which valued communalism rather than individualism. For many Maori, neoliberalism was the continuation of long-standing theme of theft and colonialism. For Jane Kelsey, “It was not surprising, then, that the most (some would say the only) sustained political resistance to the structural adjustment programme had come from” Maori.25 Kelsey’s view is romantic because, as seen above, many working class Pakeha – together with working class Maori and Pacific Islanders – opposed the benefit cuts, ECA, and closures of hospitals and other rural services. The biggest threat to the imposition of neoliberalism, in my view, came from the self-activity of the working class as a whole, not just working class Maori. Yet Kelsey is correct in stating that a major form of resistance to neoliberalism came from Maori, although she overlooks the fact that the wave of Maori protest in the 1990s mostly came from disenfranchised working class Maori. While Maori protest is undoubtedly a reaction to colonialism and Pakeha racism, and cannot be reduced to class struggle, I argue that a clear division emerged between working class Maori and “corporate warriors” or capitalist Maori in the protests of the 1990s. Hence a class based analysis of this rebellion is relevant and useful.

From the late 1960s, Maori protest activity renewed. It was given impetus by the New Left, anti-Vietnam War movement, anti-apartheid movement, new social movements and the strike wave of the late 1960s and 1970s. The Tino Rangatiratanga (or Maori self-determination) movement had two major wings, both with substantial support. One wing was “middle-class” dominated and aimed to gain concessions from the state through legalistic activity; the other was firmly opposed to the state, and more focussed upon direct action to achieve its aims. This flaxroots based self-activity culminated in direct action in the form of land occupations in the late 1970s at Raglan and Takaparawha/Bastion Point in Auckland. Bastion Point was a particular highlight as it saw a fledging class based alliance between local iwi (tribes), trade unions, and Pakeha sympathisers. Unions placed a “green ban” upon construction at the site to support local iwi.26

In response, capital and the state aimed to co-opt and divert this movement. It attempted to achieve this through the establishment of the Waitangi Tribunal (in 1975) and Maori Language Commission. From 1985, Labour allowed Maori grievances lodged with the Waitangi Tribunal to date back to the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840. Thus from 1985 Treaty claims became a route for Maori to place pressure on the state to demand monetary compensation for the colonial theft of resources. The Labour Government of 1984 to 1990 also sought a policy of co-opting of Maori elites into the state, a policy that it called “biculturalism.” The result of this policy was the enrichment of a few Maori who controlled the neotribal capitalist businesses created by treaty settlements. Correspondingly, working class Maori were made much worse off.

In the 1980s most of the Tino Rangatiratanga movement was focussed upon reviving Maori culture and language. Hundreds of autonomous Maori schools were established, cultural groups were formed, and people fought to have Maori studies introduced into the state education system. However, this cultural nationalism often led to an exclusive focus on cultural change rather than a more holistic approach. As Teanau Tuiono states,

By focusing on cultural issues this allowed the co-optation of a Maori elite within the structures of the state and forced many Maori leaders to straddle the uneasy gulf between pushing the Maori struggle forward and maintaining the existing state of affairs. The prestige and wealth that went with such privileged positions in the settlement process meant that Maori leaders became increasingly removed from the concerns and vitality of the flaxroots Maori struggle. Tino Rangatiratanga could be then seen as economic independence because we were free to enter the ‘free market.’ Capitalism with a smiley (Maori) face. Bullshit.27

The National Government of the early 1990s saw the Maori movement for self-determination as a threat to its neoliberal policies. The National Government was concerned that the backlog of Treaty claims created a climate of uncertainty for capitalists because it left the ownership of a number of key resources in doubt. Treasury officials called major Treaty claims an “unquantifiable fiscal risk.”28 National thus attempted to put a lid on these claims by negotiating a final settlement of all claims – at minimal cost to themselves.

As a result, National offered a $1 billion deal in secret negotiations with a number of “corporate warriors” and “tribal executives” called the fiscal envelope. It also brokered a deal with middle class Maori to end fisheries claims through the Sealords Deal. The 1992 Fisheries Settlement Act included a settlement between the state and some Maori to purchase a $150 million share in a major New Zealand commercial fisheries business, Sealord Products Limited.

As the state publicly admitted the existence of the fiscal envelope in 1994, Maori protest swung into action. On Waitangi Day in 1995, a militant protest of 500 Maori turned into a full-scale battle with police. The protest group Te Kawariki explained their grievances:

The recent deals struck by Maori leaders have done nothing to reverse that trend, and in fact those deals have been disasterous for all future generations of Maori people. These so-called leaders must be sidelined, and ALL Maori given a chance to have a say in determining what our destiny will be…We were conned by false Maori leaders into thinking we were on the road to success. We were told that Maori were ‘coming out of grievance mode and into development mode.’ We were touted as the ‘New Corporate Warriors’. Maori graced the covers of all the ‘right’ [wing] magazines…It seemed that after 150 years of oppression, we’d finally made it. Unfortunately, for Maori people, all the promises, all the hype, turned out to be a load of BULLSHIT!!!…There are Maori for whom cutting a deal with the Crown has been a sweet little number. These people are traitors and sellouts. They sold the Sealords Deal to our people, and picked up a cool million bucks for their treachery…As we prepare to fight against the Crown Proposals, we must also exposethe treachery within our own ranks.29

Whanganui Maori occupied Moutoa Gardens in Wanganui for 79 days in early 1995. They renamed it Pakatoire, after the site of a Maori pa that was located in the gardens. Pakatoire had been a disputed site between local Maori and the state since 1887, especially over control of fishing rights in the Whanganui River. This occupation “was to emerge as the Bastion Point of the 1990s and represented the single largest collective act of ‘civil disobedience’ since the anti-Springbok Tour protests of 1981.”30

The occupation involved thousands of Maori from all walks of life – church groups, gang members, trade unionists, as well as Pakeha sympathisers. Evan Poata-Smith paints a picture of the hive of self-activity during the occupation:

The gardens resembled a motor camp with tents and caravans set in place, with work crews responsible for different tasks throughout the day. Cooks prepared meals for a steady stream of visitors who arrived to give their support to the tangata whenua. A makeshift kitchen was constructed and the dining room was able to hold up to 150 people a sitting. Rented ablution facilities were placed at one end of the gardens and electricity was supplied with a generator. Security surrounding the gardens was tight [there was the constant threat of forcible removal by the police, as well as constant police harassment] with people rostered on shifts throughout the day and night. There were people stationed at every entrance and corner of the gardens.31

Hundreds of people visited the occupation. Far from being “separatist”, the occupation was open to the public.32 When the Wanganui District Council, who formally “owned” the gardens, gave the occupiers a deadline to leave, numbers swelled from 150 to 2000. A festive atmosphere ensued on the day of the deadline. Occupiers organised an impromptu concert and sung waiata until the deadline past.33 The result was that the Council decided not to force the eviction, and entered a process of negotiation. Numbers of occupiers declined. The Council then acquired a court order requiring the occupiers to remove all the buildings they had erected and leave the site. On 18 May 1995, almost three weeks after the failed attempt at eviction, protesters voluntarily left the site “saying they did so reluctantly but in preference to being moved on by the police.”34

The occupation of Pakaitore triggered a series of occupations by Maori in the North Island. By April 1995, there were six major occupations in progress. Many Maori saw that the legalistic framework set up in the 1980s for treaty grievances was not delivering any real benefits to working class Maori and hence took direct action. There were occupations of schools, Marae, courthouses, farmland, railway yards, airports, and even the site of the Taumaranui police station. The police evicted protesters from some of these occupations, resulting in dozens of arrests. The 25-week occupation of the former Takahue School near Kaitaia in 1995 resulted in the occupiers burning the school down after police moved in to evict them. Children set alight tyres that had been stockpiled outside the school. Sixteen arrests resulted. As well, some more novel forms of autonomy were established, with the Tuhoe tribe setting up their own embassy at Tanetua in the East Cape of the North Island, and issuing property owners with eviction notices.

Many of these occupations and protests led to direct and open conflict between Maori capitalists and working class Maori. For example, the occupations of Coalcorp land at Huntly and the Waikato University Marae were in direct opposition to the $170 million Raupatu settlement between the state and the Tainui Trust Board. Iwi were transformed into corporate bodies (such as the Tainui Trust Board for the Tainui tribes) to manage settlement assets and negotiate with the government, but everyday Maori were excluded from having a say in these boards. They claimed they were not being “represented” by the corporate bodies, but being “sold out” by them. Maori were placed under intense pressure by capital and the state to choose commodified forms of iwi. Hence while corporate warriors were (and are) in control of corporate iwi, these new governance structures are also largely shaped by the Office of Treaty Settlements. As such, corporate iwi ought to be seen as the creation of capital and the state.

Working class Maori often occupied land in direct protest against proposed settlements between their local corporate iwi and the state. Their protest was directed at their own capitalists as well as the state. For them, the hapu (which can be loosely translated as sub-tribe) and not the neo-tribal capitalist elite was the legitimate kaitiaki (guardians) of the land.35

Rata has called this new Maori capitalism created by treaty settlements a “neotribal capitalist regime of accumulation.”36 This regime centres on the transformation of tribes into capitalist enterprises, and the creation of a new tribal based capitalist elite. This elite emerged in the treaty negotiation process of the 1980s and 1990s: namely, those Maori lawyers, leaders, and bureaucrats who used their privileged positions to become the chief executive officers of neotribal capitalism. Yet Maori iwi as a whole were guaranteed access to their traditional resources, fisheries, land and so on under the Treaty of Waitangi. Under neotribal capitalism, this access to what paltry resources have been returned to Maori is effectively exclusively controlled by the new tribal capitalist elite. Even if ownership of resources is nominally owned by the whole tribe (the corporate tribe, and not an individual, is the legal owner), and even if iwi members have a shareholding in the business, the undemocratic nature of neotribal capitalist business ensures that working class iwi do not have any real say in the corporate iwi head office.

The link between economic development and wealth accumulation meant that economic development could not occur without commodity production, and commodity circulation must occur within the capitalist sphere of accumulative exchange. Commodification, with its intrinsic split between buyers and sellers of labour-power in the creation of surplus value (i.e., of wealth that can be used as capitalist investment), means class exploitative relations and not communal relations [prevail], despite the existence of communal ownership of the means of production. 37

Such a claim is somewhat debatable as the means of production is effectively owned and controlled by tribal capitalists.

Initially, many working class Maori supported neotribal capitalism because they saw it as a means to economic independence, a route out of poverty, and the basis for a revival in Maori society in general. Yet overall neotribal capitalism has amounted to a new dispossession of working class Maori. “The neotraditionalist ideology of communal kinship relations, originating in the pan-Maori ethnificiation and indigenisation movements of the 1970s and 1980s, has become the means of access and privileged relationship to traditional lands, waters and knowledge by particular groups of retribalised Maori…Communal relations of families and kin-based communities revived within the prefigurative movements are conceptualised as ‘softening’ and humanising counters to the dehumanising class relations.”38 As well, detribalised Maori, who make up the majority of the Maori population and are primarily concentrated in working class urban areas, have been excluded from corporate iwi.

Class relations within tribes are concealed by an ideology of a revived Maori culture and community. Working class Maori are encouraged to identify with their tribe as a whole, overlooking exploitative class relations within their own tribe. Thus working class Maori are encouraged to identify culturally with Maori capitalists. Maori capitalists can falsely claim that working class Maori resisting their business are resisting traditional Maori society and culture. However, many working class Maori, especially in rural areas, use Maori culture as a card to undermine capitalist Maori who they see as having ‘colonised thinking’. Corporatism is often associated with ‘Pakeha colonised’ thinking and therefore as ‘bad’. In that respect, Maori culture is used by both capitalist and working class Maori. Capitalist Maori use it to mask their own privileged position within tribes, and working class Maori use it to criticise capitalist Maori.

Corporate iwi claim to be the legitimate inheritors of the traditional iwi that were dispossessed by the English state since 1840. This is highly questionable, as traditional iwi were not corporate in structure. In fact, they practised some aspects of anti-state communism. For example, traditional iwi had a moneyless gift economy and communal ownership of property; however, early Maori society was still some form of class society, complete with chiefs, commoners, and slaves. Perhaps this hierarchy within Maori society meant it was easier for the Pakeha elite to co-opt Maori leaders in the 1980s and 1990s.

By the late 1990s, the occupation movement had largely died down, although disgruntlement and a number of occupations directed against the state and sometimes the new Maori capitalists continues to this day. Militant Maori had become isolated and temporarily defeated. Protest against neotribal capitalism became increasingly difficult as it was so personalised, as often working class Maori opposed Maori capitalists within their own extended family. Yet the massive Hikoi of May 2004 against the privatisation and commodification of the seabed and foreshore, attended by 20 000 to 30 000 people, even more than the land march of 1975, shows that working class Maori resistance is alive and kicking.